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COMMENTS
ENFORCING CONTRACTUAL WAIVERS OF A
CLAIM FOR FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Under existing California law, any party to a contract
may bring a cause of action for fraud in the inducement,'
even if the contract is integrated.2 Parol evidence is admissi-
ble to help prove a fraud cause of action. 3 This comment ar-
gues that a merger clause in a contract between business
parties who are represented by counsel during the negotia-
tion, drafting, and execution of the contract should preclude a
claim for fraud in the inducement.5
Because a suit filed for fraud in the inducement contin-
ues to be a future possibility under current law, two business
parties may not, with certainty, avoid by contract the possi-
bility of a claim of fraud in the inducement.6 The ability to do
so with certainty is a must.7 Contracting parties must man-
1. Fraud in the inducement is defined as:
Fraud which is intended to and which does cause one to execute an
instrument, or make an agreement, or render a judgment. The misrep-
resentation involved does not mislead one as to the paper he signs but
rather misleads as to the true facts of a situation, and the false impres-
sion it causes is a basis of a decision to sign or render a judgment. It
renders an agreement voidable.
BARRON's LAW DICTIONARY 200 (3d ed. 1991).
2. An integrated agreement is "a complete and final expression of the par-
ties' agreement, precluding any evidence of collateral agreements." Brinderson-
Newberg Joint Venture v. Pacific Erectors, Inc., 971 F.2d 272, 281 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1267 (1993).
3. Parol evidence is defined as: "testimony of a witness; oral rather than
written evidence." BARRON's LAw DICTIONARY 342 (3d ed. 1991).
4. A merger clause is "[a] provision in a contract to the effect that the writ-
ten terms may not be varied by prior or oral agreements because all such agree-
ments have been merged into the written document." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
989 (6th ed. 1995).
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial
Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STuD. 597, 598 (1990). Scott states that "[tihe conven-
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age the risk inherent in any business or commercial transac-
tion between sophisticated business parties.' For example,
the market price upon which the agreement was based may
change, or there may no longer be a market for the particular
product. Parties entering transactions know these risks
must be borne.9
Those who choose to enter into contracts must be willing
to accept the possibility of a loss along with the potential for a
gain. They should be free to take the risk, if they so desire,
that they have been fraudulently induced to enter into the
transaction. In other words, they should be free to contract
and allowed to "make [their] own bed and lie in it."1" Free-
dom of contract is a recognized principle; however, freedom
from contract, in the sense of allowing individuals to free
themselves from the contractual obligations to which they
consented, for example by claiming fraud, must cease to be
the automatic flip-side of that notion.11
The benefits of rectifying this lack of contractual freedom
are twofold. First, as courts and litigation consume valuable
resources,12 the resulting decrease in claims for fraud in the
inducement will be judicially economical. Second, legal cer-
tainty will be injected into business related contractual
issues. 13
The California trial court and First District Court of Ap-
peal were recently at odds concerning the validity of waiv-
ers 4 in contracts in Ron Greenspan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Ford
tional assumption.., is that in such commercial environments it is more impor-
tant for the law to be certain than to be right." Id.
8. Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc., 285 Cal. Rptr. 870 (Ct. App. 1991),
rev. denied, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 302 (1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2967 (1992).
9. Douglas G. Baird, Self-Interest and Cooperation in Long-Term Con-
tracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 583, 590 (1990); see also Richard A. Epstein & Geof-
frey R. Miller, Introduction: The Law and Economics of Risk, 19 J. LEGAL STUD.
531 (1990).
10. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts is not Dead, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1021,
1034 (1992) [hereinafter Farnsworth]; see also Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient
Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23 (1989).
11. Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 1021, 1023 (1992).
12. Charles R. Knoeber, An Alternative Mechanism to Assure Contractual
Reliability, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 334 (1983).
13. Id. at 343 (noting that the examination of both legal and market mecha-
nisms to assure contractual reliability is an area on which much recent litera-
ture has focused).
14. A waiver is defined as: "an intentional and voluntary giving up, relin-
quishment, or surrender of some known right. In general, a waiver may either
1032 [Vol. 37
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Motor Land Development Corp.15 This comment will examine
Ron Greenspan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Ford Motor Land Devel-
opment Corp.16 It will also introduce and explore the Second
District case of Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc.,17 where
the court reached the opposite conclusion from Greenspan.
After providing an in-depth analysis of the validity of waivers
and concluding that the approach in Banco better suits the
needs of both the legal and non-legal communities,' this
comment will propose a solution to the waiver question raised
in Greenspan.9 The public policy concerns regarding such a
proposal, as addressed in other jurisdictions,20 will be ex-
amined, as well as the benefits derived from the proposal,
namely more certainty in contractual relations and a positive
effect on judicial economy.21
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Parol Evidence Rule and Recovery for Fraud
The parol evidence rule provides that where parties to a
contract have set forth the terms of their agreement in a writ-
ing which they intend as the final and complete expression of
their understanding, the writing is deemed integrated and
may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement
or of a contemporaneous oral agreement.22 Whether or not
result from an express agreement or be inferred from circumstances." BARRON'S
LAw DICTIONARY 524 (3d ed. 1991).
15. 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783 (Ct. App. 1995), rev. denied, 1995 Cal. LEXIS 3383
(1995).
16. Id.
17. 285 Cal. Rptr. 870 (Ct. App. 1991), rev. denied, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 302
(1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2967 (1992).
18. See infra Part IV.A.
19. See infra Part V.
20. See Guido v. Koopman, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437 (Ct. App. 1991), rev. denied,
1992 Cal. LEXIS 2024 (1992); Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597
(N.Y. 1959); Sabo v. Delman, 143 N.E.2d 906 (N.Y. 1957).
21. See infra Parts IV.E-F.
22. In California, the parol evidence rule is defined in the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure § 1856. It provides:
(a) Terms set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are in-
cluded therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agree-
ment or of a contemporaneous oral agreement.
(b) The terms set forth in a writing described in subdivision (a)
may be explained or supplemented by evidence of consistent additional
terms unless the writing is intended also as a complete and exclusive
statement of the terms of the agreement.
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parol evidence 23 is introduced is a question of law to be deter-
mined by the court.24
Application of the parol evidence rule involves a two part
analysis. First, was the writing intended to be an integra-
tion, in other words, a complete and final expression of the
parties' agreement, precluding any evidence of collateral
agreements? Second, is the agreement susceptible of the
meaning contended for by the party offering the evidence.25
In determining whether the parties intended the written
agreement to be integrated, the instrument itself is scruti-
nized.2 6 The intention of the parties to nullify any previous
understandings or agreements may be expressed in a clause
stating that there are no prior understandings or agreements
not contained in the writing, and thus express the parties'
intention to negate any prior understandings or
agreements.27
In addition to looking at the agreement itself, the sur-
rounding circumstances, and the prior negotiations between
the parties, the court must also look at two policy considera-
(c) The terms set forth in a writing described in subdivision (a)
may be explained or supplemented by course of dealing or usage of
trade or by course of performance.
(d) The court shall determine whether the writing is intended by
the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to
such terms as are included therein and whether the writing is in-
tended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the
agreement.
(e) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing is put in issue
by the pleadings, this section does not exclude evidence relevant to
that issue.
f) Where the validity of the agreement is the fact in dispute, this
section does not exclude evidence relevant to that issue.
(g) This section does not exclude other evidence of the circum-
stances under which the agreement was made or to which it relates, as
defined in section 1860, or to explain an extrinsic ambiguity or other-
wise interpret the terms of the agreement, or to establish illegality or
fraud.
(h) As used in this section, the term agreement includes deeds and
wills, as well as contracts between parties.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1856 (West 1996); Banco, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 885 n.42.
23. See supra note 3.
24. See supra note 22, part (d).
25. Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc., 285 Cal. Rptr. 870, 898 (Ct. App.
1991), rev. denied, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 302 (1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2967
(1992).
26. Id.; CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 578 (1960).
27. Banco, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
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tions.2' First, human memory lacks the accuracy of written
evidence.29 Excluding parol evidence which directly conflicts
with the writing can serve this policy.3 0 Second, it is feared
that "fraud or unintentional invention by witnesses inter-
ested in the outcome of the litigation will mislead the finder
of facts."31 Indicia of credibility can alleviate this fear.3 2 Two
such indicia are, first, if the court chooses a formulation
based on the Restatement Second of Contracts,33 "[a]n oral
agreement is credible if it might naturally have been made as
a separate agreement by parties similarly situated."34 Sec-
ond, based on Uniform Commercial Code section 2-202, which
applies to transactions in goods, an oral agreement is also
"'credible unless it can be said with certainty that the parties
would have included the oral agreement in the writing. '
A classic exception to the parol evidence rule arises in
the area of fraud. In order to recover for fraud, five factors
must be proven: (1) misrepresentation (including a "promise"
made without intent to perform); (2) knowledge of the repre-
sentation's falsity; (3) intent to defraud; (4) justifiable reli-
ance; and (5) resulting damage. 6 Despite an integration
clause, parol evidence 37 is admissible to help prove fraud in
the inducement.3
28. Id. at 899.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 216 (1992).
34. Banco, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 899; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 216 (1992).
35. Banco, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 873; U.C.C. § 2-202 (1992). In summary, the
Banco court stated:
We perceive that an analysis based on the examination of four ques-
tions is appropriate: (1) does the written agreement appear on its face
to be a complete agreement; obviously, the presence of an 'integration'
clause will be very persuasive, if not controlling, on this issue; (2) does
the alleged oral agreement directly contradict the written instrument;
(3) can it be said that the oral agreement might naturally have been
made as a separate agreement or, to put it another way, if the oral
agreement had been actually agreed to, would it certainly have been
included in the written instrument; and (4) would evidence of the oral
agreement be likely to mislead the trier of fact.
Banco, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900.
36. Banco, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 896; 5 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAL. LAw., TORTS
§ 676 (9th ed. 1995).
37. See supra note 3.
38. See supra note 1 and note 22, part (g).
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B. California Civil Code Section 1542
California courts hold contractual language invalid not
only under the parol evidence rule in a fraud action, but also
under section 1542 of the California Civil Code. Section 1542
states: "A general release does not extend to claims which
the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his favor at
the time of executing a release, which if known by him must
have materially affected his settlement with the debtor."39
Although this section generally applies to personal injury re-
leases, it has also been held to negate contractual waivers.4 °
C. Waiver Upheld in Fisher v. Pennsylvania Life Co.
In Fisher v. Pennsylvania Life Co.,41 the plaintiff sold two
businesses to the defendant.4 2 When the defendant breached
the agreement, the plaintiff threatened to sue.43 After negoti-
ations, in which plaintiff was represented by counsel, the par-
ties entered into a settlement agreement.44 Clause six of the
agreement released the defendant from all claims, whether
the claims were "now known or unknown (Fisher and
Shrotman, . . . are expressly contracting as to unknown
claims), and Fisher and Shrotman ... hereby waive the provi-
sions of section 154241 of the California Civil Code, and any
other similar law of any jurisdiction other than California." 46
Clause thirteen of the settlement agreement contained a
merger clause stating that "Fisher and Shrotman... hereby
acknowledge that neither Fisher nor Shrotman... has made
and entered into this Agreement in reliance upon any war-
ranty or representation by any person or entity whatever ex-
cept for warranties or representations specifically set forth
herein."4' The Fisher court held that the plaintiff could not
base its fraud claim on alleged misrepresentations, since both
the plaintiff and defendant expressly agreed that they were
39. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1542 (West 1996).
40. See infra Part IV.G.
41. 138 Cal. Rptr. 181 (Ct. App. 1977).
42. Id. at 182.
43. Id. at 184.
44. Id. at 182-83.
45. See supra Part II.B.
46. Fisher, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
47. Id.
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entering the agreement in reliance only on the representa-
tions set forth in the agreement.48
D. The "No Representations" Clause Struck Down in Ron
Greenspan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Ford Motor Land
Development Corp.
In Ron Greenspan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Ford Motor Land
Development Corp.,49 the issue was not a section 1542 re-
lease,5 ° but whether a contract clause 51 stating that the par-
ties relied only on representations contained in the contract
establishes, as a matter of law, that there was no reasonable
reliance on representations not contained in the contract by a
party claiming fraud.52 In the failed commercial transaction,
plaintiff conditioned the purchase of a dealership from de-
fendant on the completion of a real property exchange.5 3 The
trial court held that the plaintiff Greenspan did not reason-
ably rely as a matter of law on alleged misrepresentations not
included in the parties' written agreement. The merger
clause was effectively considered a waiver of plaintiffs right
to sue for fraud in the inducement.
54
In reaching its decision, the trial court relied upon the
earlier case of Fisher v. Pennsylvania Life Co.,55 which estab-
lished, in the Greenspan trial court's view, that a "no repre-
sentations clause," such as that contained in the Greenspan
agreement, "made any reliance on alleged representations
unjustifiable as a matter of law."56
48. Id. at 184. See also infra note 56.
49. 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783 (Ct. App. 1995), rev. denied, 1995 Cal. LEXIS 3383
(1995).
50. See supra Part II.B.
51. The clause in the actual agreement stated:
11.9 Sole Agreement. This agreement constitutes the sole agreement
among the parties, and supersedes any and all prior oral or written
agreements or understandings among them, pertaining to the transac-
tions contemplated in this Agreement. No express or implied represen-
tations, warranties, or inducements have been made by any party to
any other party except as set forth in this Agreement.
Greenspan, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 785.
52. Id. at 784.
53. Id. The contemplated transaction was an exchange of real property be-
tween Leasco and HSA; the defendant was a general partner of HSA. Id. HSA
was to transfer title of its Howard Street property to Leasco, who would then
rent it back to the defendant at a favorable rate. Id.
54. Id.
55. 138 Cal. Rptr. 181 (Ct. App. 1977).
56. Greenspan, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 785. The Fisher court stated:
1037
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The Greenspan court of appeal held that the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment as to the plaintiffs
fraud claims, and it reversed the judgment.57 The court re-
versed the summary judgment on two grounds.5" First, the
court argued that the Fisher ruling relied upon by the Green-
span trial court was not supported by the authority upon
which it relied.59 Second, the court asserted that the Fisher
ruling was inconsistent with a line of California cases al-
lowing the admission of parol evidence to prove fraud in the
inducement, even when the contract contained an integration
clause.6 o
1. The Cited Authority, Casey v. Proctor and
Kronsberg v. Milton J. Wershow Co., did not
Support the Fisher Decision
The Greenspan court of appeal stated that the Casey de-
cision did not support the Fisher holding and was not directly
relevant to Fisher because it involved a general release per-
taining to tort liability, not a representation clause in a con-
Plaintiff here relies on cases that hold that, where an agreement is
obtained by fraud, it may be rescinded in spite of provisions therein
purporting to waive fraud. But those cases are inapposite to this case.
Here, plaintiff had agreed that he (and Shrotman) had entered into the
1971 agreement in reliance only on the representations set forth in
that agreement. Such an agreement amounts to a statement, now
binding on plaintiff, that any other representations previously made to
him were not material inducements to his execution of the 1971 agree-
ment. Since he thus, in 1971, agreed that he had not relied on the
representations on which he now seeks recovery, he cannot now claim
otherwise.
Fisher, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
57. Greenspan, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 784.
58. Id. at 786.
59. Id. The Fisher court supported its position with Casey v. Proctor, 378
P.2d 579 (Cal. 1963) and Kronsberg v. Milton J. Wershow Co., 47 Cal. Rptr. 592(Ct. App. 1965). In its holding, the Casey court stated that, under § 1542,
whether a general release extends to unknown injuries is a question of fact to
be determined by evidence of intent independent of the actual language in the
release. Casey, 378 P.2d at 586. The Kronsberg court rejected the admission of
parol evidence to prove the alleged fraud. Kronsberg, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 596. The
court stated, "a party having agreed in writing to do a certain thing may not
stultify his written agreement by claiming that, in fact, he relied upon the other
party's oral promise that the terms of the agreement should not be complied
with." Id.
60. Kronsberg, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
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tract.6 1 Also, the Greenspan court argued that Casey did not
support the idea that a no representations clause "made any
reliance on alleged representations unjustifiable as a matter
of law," as stated in Fisher, but rather stood for the notion
that "'boilerplate' language in agreements is not always
conclusive."62
Further, according to the Greenspan court, Kronsberg
failed to support the Fisher court's conclusion.63 In Kron-
sberg, the plaintiffs property was sold at auction by the de-
fendant corporation, and the plaintiff alleged fraud in the in-
ducement of the auction agreement.6 4 The Kronsberg court
denied admission of parol evidence to prove the alleged
fraud. 5 The Greenspan court argued that Kronsberg did not
support the Fisher holding because, unlike the Kronsberg
court, the Fisher court did not rely on the parol evidence rule
to support its holding.
66
2. Fisher is Inconsistent with California Law
In addition to arguing that the Fisher court's cited au-
thority did not support its position, the Greenspan court of
appeal also claimed that Fisher failed to follow a line of Cali-
fornia cases holding that a merger clause does not bar an ac-
tion for fraud.67 This line of California cases includes Sim-
mons v. Ratterree Land Co.,68 Herzog v. Capital Co.,69 Vai v.
Bank of America,7 ° and Buist v. C. Dudley DeVelbiss Corp.7"
a. Simmons v. Ratterree Land Co.
In Simmons, a purchaser of real property was granted a
rescission on the basis of fraud.72 The defendant admitted
61. Greenspan, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787. In Casey v. Proctor, the court held
that plaintiffs personal injury claim (unknown to him at the time he signed a
release deriving from his property damage claims) was not barred by a general
release because, under Civil Code § 1542, plaintiff could avoid the release even
though it specifically included "unknown... injuries." Casey, 378 P.2d at 589.
62. Greenspan, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 790.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 788.
68. 17 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1932).
69. 164 P.2d 8 (Cal. 1961).
70. 364 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1961).
71. 6 Cal. Rptr. 259 (Ct. App. 1960).
72. Simmons, 17 P.2d at 727, 730.
1039
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the misrepresentations, but argued it was relieved from lia-
bility.73 Defendant relied on a contract provision stating that
the plaintiff had inspected the property and did not rely on
any representations of the seller or its agents except those
stated in the contract, and that all representations inducing
the buyer to enter into the contract were contained therein. 4
The Simmons court rejected the defendant's argument,
holding that it is well settled law "that a seller cannot escape
liability for his own fraud or false representations by the in-
sertion of provisions such as are embodied in the contract of
sale herein."75
b. Herzog v. Capital Co.
Like Simmons, the Herzog court held that a "no repre-
sentations clause" in a contract did not insulate a principal
from being held liable for his own fraudulent conduct.76 The
court stated that a principal, under a positive duty to dis-
close, could not relieve itself of any liability for failure to dis-
close by placing a clause in a contract to the effect that there
are no representations outside of the written agreement. 7
c. Vai v. Bank of America
The Vai case concerned an agreement dividing commu-
nity property. 78 The agreement contained a clause stating
that the contract was entered into voluntarily and based only
on promises contained therein. 79 The court held that the
plaintiff was not estopped from asserting fraud, because
when an agreement is procured by fraud, none of its provi-
sions are legally binding.8 0 As in Herzog, the Vai court did
not consider the representations clause as a waiver of the
plaintiffs right to sue for fraud. 1
73. Id. at 728.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Herzog v. Capital Co., 164 P.2d 8, 9 (Cal. 1945).
77. Id. at 10.
78. Vai v. Bank of Am., 364 P.2d 247, 249 (Cal. 1961).
79. Id. at 256.
80. Id.
81. Id.
1040 [Vol. 37
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d. Buist v. C. Dudley DeVelbiss Corp.
The Simmons, Herzog, and Vai decisions were followed
by Buist. 2 In Buist, the plaintiff was granted judgment in a
fraud action arising out of the plaintiffs purchase of real
property.8 3 The court rejected the defendant's argument that
the merger clause contained in the contract established that
the alleged misrepresentations were not made.84 The court
cast aside this argument, reasoning that there is an exception
to the parol evidence rule for evidence of fraudulent represen-
tations inducing the execution of a contract.8 5 In addition,
the court argued that a party may not avoid liability for fail-
ure to meet its duty to disclose by relying on a merger clause
in a contract.8 6
3. The Greenspan Reversal
The Greenspan court of appeal argued that the above
case law, stating that a merger clause does not bar an action
for fraud, was ignored by Fisher and was in direct conflict
with the holding in that case.8 7 In addition, the court pointed
out that Fisher has consistently been ignored by California
courts and commentators.8 8 Instead, the rule that a merger
clause, such as that in Fisher, does not bar an action for fraud
has been applied.8 9
Finally, the court noted that although Fisher did not dis-
cuss the parol evidence rule, its holding was "inconsistent
82. Buist v. C. Dudley DeVelbiss Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 259, 261 (Ct App.
1960).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 263.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Ron Greenspan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Ford Motor Land Dev't Corp., 38
Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 788 (Ct. App. 1995), rev. denied, 1995 Cal. LEXIS 3383
(1995).
88. Id.
89. Id. The court also cites Witkin, which states:
A party to a contract who has been guilty of fraud in its inducement
cannot absolve himself from the effects of his fraud by any stipulation
in the contract, either that no representations have been made, or that
any right which might be grounded upon them is waived. Such a stipu-
lation or waiver will be ignored, and parol evidence of misrepresenta-
tions will be admitted, for the reason that fraud renders the whole
agreement voidable, including the waiver provisions.
Id. at 788 n.7; 1 BERNARD E. WrTKuN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, CONTRACTS
§ 410 (9th ed. 1995).
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with the well-settled rule that parol evidence is admissible to
prove fraud in the inducement 'even though the contract re-
cites that all conditions and representations are embodied
therein."'' s With the above reasoning, the Greenspan court
reversed the summary judgment granted by the trial court,
because, in its opinion, the defendants had not "established
an absence of triable issues entitling them to summary
judgment."91
E. Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc.
In Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc.,92 the court of
appeal, in reversing the trial court's holding, stated that the
parol evidence rule barred admission of evidence of the al-
leged oral agreement to alter the terms of the written guar-
anty, since that written instrument was intended to reflect
the parties' entire agreement, and the oral agreement was
not needed to add in any necessary terms or to explain any
ambiguities.93
In Banco, the plaintiff bank filed suit against the defend-
ant guarantor of a company's debts, which were secured by
the guarantor's purchase of inventory.94 The defendant filed
a cross-complaint against the bank, claiming the bank failed
to honor an oral promise to extend a $2 million line of credit
90. Greenspan, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 789 (quoting Ferguson v. Koch, 268 P.
342, 345 (Cal. 1928)); Mooney v. Cyriacks, 185 Cal. 70, 80-81 (Ct. App. 1921)
(holding contract provision which recites that all conditions and representa-
tions are embodied therein will not prevent plaintiff from introducing parol evi-
dence that sale was induced by fraud); Morris v. Harbor Boat Bldg. Co., 247
P.2d 589, 593 (Ct. App. 1952) (" '[it was never intended that the parol evidence
rule should be used as a shield to prevent the proof of fraud.., even though the
contract recites that all conditions and representations are embodied
therein.'"(quoting Ferguson v. Koch, 268 P. 342, 345 (Cal. 1928)); Oak Indus.,
Inc. v. Foxboro Co., 596 F. Supp. 601, 607 (S.D. Cal. 1984) (holding under Cali-
fornia law, extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove fraud in the inducement,
notwithstanding a contract provision that no representations have been made
other than those stated in the agreement); Aplications Inc. v. Hewlett Packard
Co., 501 F. Supp. 129, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 672 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1982)
(holding under California law, parol evidence is admissible to prove fraud de-
spite contract provision waiving representations not stated in the agreement).
91. Greenspan, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 790.
92. 285 Cal. Rptr. 870 (Ct. App. 1991), rev. denied, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 302
(1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2967 (1992).
93. Id. at 887. The court also held that even if the parol evidence of the
alleged oral agreement were admissible, that evidence was inadequate to estab-
lish the presence of an oral agreement or fraud. Id. at 891.
94. Id. at 873.
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to the guarantors when they purchased the inventory, and
that the bank committed fraud in making this false promise
and in misrepresenting the financial standing of the com-
pany.95 The trial court entered judgment for the guarantors
on their cross-complaint and against the bank, which the
court of appeal reversed.96
In discussing the nature of the parol evidence rule,97 the
court made it clear that regardless of its persuasiveness, evi-
dence of any oral understandings is legally irrelevant and the
parties' integrated written agreement is their exclusive and
binding contract. "[I] t is a rule of substantive law making the
integrated written agreement of the parties their exclusive
and binding contract no matter how persuasive the evidence of
additional oral understandings. Such evidence is legally ir-
relevant and cannot support a judgment."9 In addition, the
court asserted that it would decide the issue of whether the
guaranty agreement was integrated and whether the parol
evidence rule applied9 9 to exclude any evidence of a collateral
agreement de novo, as it is a question of law to be determined
by the court. 100
The Banco court applied the parol evidence rule.101 It de-
termined that the guaranty agreement was indeed inte-
grated, finding it was intended by the parties to be the com-
plete expression of their understanding.102 The agreement
appeared on its face to fully describe the relationship between
the parties, and "most importantly ... it [contained] an ex-
press 'integration' clause. This provision, which the respon-
dents concede they read, understood and discussed with their
attorneys,"1 °3 clearly made the agreement integrated.0 4 In
95. Id. at 884.
96. Id. at 872-73.
97. See supra Part II.A.
98. Banco, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
99. The purpose of applying the parol evidence rule is to discourage inter-
ested parties or witnesses to a contract from committing fraud, perjury, or unin-
tentional invention by stating that the contract did not actually represent the
agreement of the parties. In addition, the parol evidence rule controls the ten-
dency of sympathetic juries to release parties from their bad bargains. Id. at
887 (citing Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968)).
100. Id. at 885-86.
101. Id. at 870.
102. Id. at 887.
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Banco, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 887. The integration clause provided that the
agreement "embodies the entire agreement and understanding among the par-
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fact, the court found it difficult to imagine a clearer method
for expressing the intent to make the written agreement a
full and complete expression of the parties' relationship. 1 5
In looking at the entire transaction, the court placed spe-
cial emphasis on the surrounding circumstances, the back-
ground of the transaction, and the fact that the respondents
"were sophisticated and experienced businessmen who were
at all times, from the very outset of their involvement ...
advised, counseled and assisted by attorneys of their own
choosing.... [R]espondents were both cautious and deliber-
ate with respect to their negotiations and agreements in this
matter."10 6 In reversing the trial court, the court of appeal
reasoned that the alleged oral, collateral agreement would
not naturally be part of a separate agreement.1 0 7
Despite the fact that an allegedly primary factor in the
agreement was the $2 million line of credit over a six month
period from Banco, there was no mention of it in the agree-
ment itself, nor in any other contemporaneous writings. 0
Respondents argued that there were some negotiations, or
some pending negotiations, regarding the possible future ex-
tension of a $2 million line of credit, but that did not convince
the court that the agreement was not integrated. 09 If in-
stead of incomplete discussions, a prior binding assurance
had been negotiated, it would have been illogical for the par-
ties to have omitted such a credit arrangement in the written
agreement, which claimed to embody the total agreement be-
tween the parties. 1 0 In fact, when called as a witness, their
own attorney conceded that he understood that any credit
line agreement would have been spelled out in writing."'
The Banco court concluded its discussion with a general
comment." 2 The court stated its view that parties to a con-
tract in California are, and should be seen by the courts as
ties hereto and supersedes all prior agreements and understandings relating to
the subject matter hereof." Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 888 (emphasis added). The guaranty agreement, which was a ma-
jor debt restructuring sought by plaintiffs, was negotiated by plaintiffs with the
repeated aid of their counsel. Id. at 880.
107. Id. at 888.
108. Id. at 889.
109. Id. at 896.
110. Banco, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 877-84.
111. Id. at 876-77 n.12, 890.
112. Id. at 893.
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being, "capable of drafting a written instrument which will
fully and completely define a particular legal relationship."'
13
In addition, the court argued that at the very center of the
judicial function is the task of providing "legal certainty and
reasonable predictability" in the affairs of its people; its func-
tion does not include making such certainty unattainable.
114
Further, addressing the rights and obligations of parties
to a contract, the court expressed its view that "[parties to a
business or commercial ,transaction, such as those in this
case, should be able to clearly express their intent as to the
nature and scope of their legal relationship and then be able
to rely on that expression."" 5 The court stated that in cases
such as the one at hand, where both parties agree that their
entire relationship is clearly defined in a particular written
instrument, both parties are "entitled and required to live
with the agreed terms."" 6 In its final clause concluding the
court's discussion of the applicability of the parol evidence
rule, the Banco court stated in no uncertain terms its convic-
tion that "[tihe courts simply cannot permit clear and unam-
biguous integrated agreements ... to be rendered meaning-
less by the oral revisionist claims of a party who, at the end of
the game, does not care for the result."" 7
F. "Sophisticated Business Parties"
The Banco court argued that "sophisticated business par-
ties" should live by the terms of their agreement.1 8 There is
currently no precise description of what it means to be a "so-
phisticated business party." However, the Uniform Commer-
cial Code can be of some assistance in formulating a defini-
tion." '9 The Uniform Commercial Code defines a "merchant"
and "between merchants" under Article 2 by stating:
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind
or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods in-
volved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or
skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or
113. Id; see infra Part III.
114. Banco, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
115. Id.
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. Id.
118. See supra Part II.E.
119. U.C.C. (1992).
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broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds
himself out as having such knowledge or skill. 120
"Between merchants" means in any transaction with re-
spect to which both parties are chargeable with the
knowledge or skill of merchants.12 1
Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters122
states that "'between merchants' is a term of art in the Uni-
form Commercial Code. It means between commercially so-
phisticated parties." 23 While Article 2 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code applies specifically to transactions in goods,' 24 a
similar definition would apply to specify instances in which
courts would uphold a merger clause waiving the right to sue
for fraud in the inducement. 125
G. Public Policy in California and Other Jurisdictions
There is ample policy justification for allowing parol evi-
dence to show fraud.'26 This line of cases includes Foreman
& Clark Corp. v. Fallon,'127 Guido v. Koopman,12 s Sabo v. Del-
man, 129 and Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris.130 However, al-
lowing a waiver of the right to sue for fraud in the induce-
ment when the contract is between two sophisticated
business parties carves out a narrow exception to this general
policy. 3 ' Such a waiver is justified, because "[t]o hold other-
wise would be to say that it is impossible for two businessmen
dealing at arm's length to agree that the buyer is not buying
in reliance on any representations of the seller as to a partic-
ular fact.' 3 2 Allowing a waiver of the right to sue for fraud
in the inducement would provide the necessary certainty in
contractual relations between business parties.1 33
120. Id. § 2-104(1).
121. Id. § 2-104(3).
122. 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986).
123. Id. at 1284.
124. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1992).
125. See infra Part V.
126. See infra notes 127-30.
127. 479 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1971).
128. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437 (Ct. App. 1991), rev. denied, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 2024
(1992) (discussing the implications of § 1668 of the California Civil Code).
129. 143 N.E.2d 906 (N.Y. 1957).
130. 157 N.E.2d 597 (N.Y. 1959).
131. See infra Part V.
132. Danann, 157 N.E.2d at 600.
133. Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc., 285 Cal. Rptr. 870 (Ct. App. 1991),
rev. denied, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 302 (1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2967 (1992).
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1. Legal Representation
In Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon, the plaintiff sought
damages for breach of a lease agreement between itself and
defendants.1 3 4 During negotiations, the defendants were rep-
resented by Norris, an attorney with thirty-three years of ex-
perience. 135 The court noted the fact that this attorney took
part in the drafting of the agreement and allowed the inclu-
sion of the merger clause.' 36 Also, the court emphasized that
had one of the alleged misrepresentations been material and
relied upon by defendants in executing the lease, an attorney
with the experience of Norris would have insisted upon in-
cluding those representations in the written lease.1
37
In Guido v. Koopman,13 8 the appellant sought reversal of
a judgment freeing respondent from all liability for appel-
lant's horseback riding accident.' 39 Before starting lessons at
respondent's horseback riding academy, appellant signed a
release. 140 Appellant argued that the release should not be
upheld, because it was allegedly executed in reliance on re-
spondent's misrepresentation that it would not be en-
forced.' 4 ' The court noted that the appellant was an attor-
ney, was familiar with releases, and in fact used them in her
own practice."4 2 Because of this legal knowledge, the appel-
lant could not claim to have executed the written release,
without having read it, in reliance on statements made by the
defendant that the release was unenforceable.
143
2. The General Public
In the New York case of Sabo v. Delman, the plaintiff
sued to rescind a contract on the basis of fraud.14 The court
ruled that the merger clause in the contract would not pre-
vent the introduction of evidence of fraudulent representa-
134. Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon, 479 P.2d 362, 364 (Cal. 1971).
135. Id. at 366.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Guido v. Koopman, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437 (Ct. App. 1991), rev. denied, 1992
Cal. LEXIS 2024 (1992).
139. Id. at 438.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 439.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Sabo v. Delman, 143 N.E.2d 906 (N.Y. 1957).
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tions. 4 5 The court reasoned that otherwise, defendants
would easily be able to perpetrate fraud and be free from lia-
bility if they included a merger clause in the agreement. 146
In Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, also a New York case,
the plaintiff claimed fraud in the inducement. 47 The plain-
tiff argued that defendants made false representations to the
plaintiff, which induced the plaintiff to purchase a contract of
sale for a building lease. 148 The contract included both a
merger clause and a disclaimer as to specific representa-
tions. 1 49 The Danann court denied the plaintiffs cause of ac-
tion for fraud and refused to allow the plaintiff to avoid the
bad bargain.15 0 The court reasoned that if it allowed the
cause of action for fraud, businesspeople would be unable to
draft a contract free from any reliance on representations.'
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
At present, parties freely entering a contract are unable
to make it completely reliable because the right to sue for
fraud in the inducement 52 remains a viable option for either
party if they dislike the outcome of the contract. This choice
is available even if the contract is integrated and the parties
are businesspeople.1 1 Retaining such a rule is detrimental
because, as stated in Banco:
It is the essence of the judicial function to contribute to
legal certainty and reasonable predictability in the affairs
of our citizens rather than to suggest that such goals are
not attainable. Parties to a business or commercial trans-
action... should be able to clearly express their intent as
to the nature and scope of their legal relationship and
then be able to rely on that expression.'
145. Id. at 909.
146. Id.
147. Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597 (N.Y. 1959).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 599.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 600.
152. See supra note 1.
153. See supra Part II.F.
154. Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc., 285 Cal. Rptr. 870, 893 (Ct. App.
1991), rev. denied, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 302 (1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2967
(1992).
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Sophisticated business parties must have "legal certainty
and reasonable predictability" in contractual relations.
155
Such certainty is necessary to uphold the integrity of the con-
tracting process and provide incentives for business parties to
continue entering into contracts. 156 Sophisticated parties re-
quire assurance that each party must abide by the written
contract terms.
15 7
IV. ANALYsis
A. The Banco Approach is Superior
The view expressed by the court of appeal in Banco is
essentially that expressed by the trial court in Greenspan.58
Parties to a business or commercial transaction, such as the
failed property exchange in Greenspan or the guaranty agree-
ment in Banco, should be able to draft a written agreement
which clearly sets forth the legal relationship between the
two parties.159 In addition, the parties must be able to rely
on the validity of that contract.
160
Courts play an essential role in allowing parties to rely
upon business or commercial transactions; to be able to rely
on the words embodied in the contract, sophisticated business
parties must be assured that the contents of such agreements
will be upheld in court. 161 Courts must sustain the intended
meaning of unambiguous integrated agreements and not al-
low these contracts to be augmented by parties who, in the
end, are unhappy with the result of their freely negotiated
contract. 162 Without such court action, disgruntled parties
will continue to seek to avoid the written contract and revise
its original, intended meaning by claiming oral promises
were made that induced them to sign the contract.
163
155. Id.
156. Baird, supra note 9, at 584.
157. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
158. Ron Greenspan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Ford Motor Land Dev. Corp., 38
Cal. Rptr. 2d 783 (Ct. App. 1995), rev. denied, 1995 Cal. LEXIS 3383 (1995).
159. Banco, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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B. The Emphasis Placed on Legal Representation
Both the Greenspan and Banco cases concerned business
or commercial transactions.' 64 Also, the cases emphasized
the fact that both parties were represented by counsel
throughout the entire negotiation and transaction. 165  The
presence of legal expertise has been a factor in other cases as
well, such as Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon'66 and Guido
v. Koopman.167
1. Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon
In Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon, the plaintiff sought
damages for breach of a lease agreement between itself and
defendants. 168 During the lease negotiations, the defendants
were represented by an experienced attorney.169 The court
emphasized that had one of the alleged misrepresentations
been material and relied upon by defendants in executing the
lease, "such an experienced lawyer would have required the
representation to be included in the written lease." v°
164. Ron Greenspan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Ford Motor Land Dev. Corp., 38
Cal. Rptr. 2d 783 (Ct. App. 1995), rev. denied, 1995 Cal. LEXIS 3383 (1995);
Banco, 285 Cal. Rptr. 870.
165. The Banco court states, both in the text and in the footnotes, that "[t is
important to emphasize that the respondents, in all of their dealings with
Banco, as well as Kudsy, were advised and assisted by their own counsel."
Banco, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 881 n.7.
The Greenspan court declined respondent's suggestion that a new rule be
adopted stating that, "under certain circumstances (e.g., when parties are rep-
resented by counsel or have some level of business sophistication), a standard
representations clause in a contract bars justifiable reliance on certain sorts of
alleged misrepresentations, as a matter of law." Greenspan, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
788 n.6. Instead of adopting the solution proposed by the respondents, the
Greenspan court chose to adhere to the current rule in California, as summa-
rized in Witkin, that:
A party to a contract who has been guilty of fraud in its inducement
cannot absolve himself from the effects of his fraud by any stipulation
in the contract, either that no representations have been made, or that
any right which might be grounded upon them is waived. Such a stipu-
lation or waiver will be ignored, and parol evidence of misrepresenta-
tions will be admitted, for the reason that fraud renders the whole
agreement voidable, including the waiver provision.
Id. at 788-89 n.7; 1 BERNARD E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, CON-
TRACTS § 410 (9th ed. 1995).
166. Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon, 479 P.2d 363 (Cal. 1971).
167. Guido v. Koopman, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437 (Ct. App. 1991), rev. denied, 1992
Cal. LEXIS 2024 (1992).
168. Foreman, 479 P.2d at 364.
169. Id. at 366.
170. Id.
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2. Guido v. Koopman
The importance the Foreman court placed on the fact the
defendant received legal advice from experienced counsel
throughout the negotiation, suggests that a heightened stan-
dard of proof is required in order for fraud in the inducement
to be asserted when a party is represented by counsel. 171 In
addition, such a heightened standard appeared in Guido,
where the appellant sought reversal of a judgment enforcing
respondent's release from all liability for appellant's horse-
back riding accident. 172 The court focused on the fact that
the appellant was an attorney and used releases in her own
practice. 173 Thus, the appellant could not claim to have re-
lied on respondent's statements that the release was unen-
forceable when she executed it without reading it. 174
The Guido court emphasized the concept that "[iin deter-
mining whether one can reasonably or justifiably rely on an
alleged misrepresentation, the knowledge, education and ex-
perience of the person claiming reliance must be consid-
ered."' 7 5 This notion was not considered by the court of ap-
peal when it handed down its reversal of the trial court's
summary judgment ruling in Greenspan.76 It refused to ac-
cept the respondents' argument that it should uphold the
trial court's summary judgment.
In part, the Greenspan trial court based its decision on
the fact that both parties had superior knowledge, meaning
that they were both represented by counsel throughout the
entire process of negotiating and drafting the agreement, and
thus could not have justifiably relied on alleged misrepresen-
tations which were not reduced to writing. 77 Unlike Guido,
the Greenspan court declined to consider "the knowledge, ed-
ucation and experience of the person claiming reliance."'7 8
Had it done so, the fact that both Greenspan parties were so-
phisticated business parties would arguably have led the
171. Id.
172. Guido v. Koopman, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 439 (Ct. App. 1991), rev. denied,
1992 Cal. LEXIS 2024 (1992).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Ron Greenspan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Ford Motor Land Dev. Corp., 38
Cal. Rptr. 2d 783 (Ct. App. 1995), rev. denied, 1995 Cal. LEXIS 3383 (1995).
177. Id. at 785; see also supra note 165.
178. Guido, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439.
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court of appeal to the same conclusion as in Banco, and it
would have affirmed the summary judgment for defendants.
C. Resolving the Differences in the Greenspan Decisions:
Sophisticated Businesspeople
In order to resolve the difference of opinion between the
Greenspan trial court and the court of appeal, emphasis must
be placed on the knowledge of the parties entering into the
contract, as was done in Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon'7 9
and Guido v. Koopman.'8 ° Special guidelines must be set to
distinguish between instances in which parties should be pre-
vented from claiming fraud in the inducement because the
contract contains a merger clause, and those cases in which
the current California law, stating that a merger clause
should not bar an action for fraud, should be applied.1 8 '
The Uniform Commercial Code1 8 2 provides some gui-
dance in defining those parties to be bound by the merger
clauses in their contracts; these specific parties are "sophisti-
cated business parties."8 3 The Uniform Commercial Code
defines a "merchant" as a person who deals in, holds himself
or herself out as, or has special knowledge or skill peculiar to
the goods involved in the transaction. 8 4 In addition, the
Commercial Code defines "between merchants" under Article
2 as any transaction in which both parties hold the knowl-
edge or skill of merchants.1 85 Also, Wisconsin Knife v. Na-
tional Metal Crafters 1 6 describes "between merchants" in the
Commercial Code as being a term of art meaning "between
commercially sophisticated business parties."8 7 Moreover,
using these definitions to identify those parties allowed to
waive the right to sue for fraud in the inducement would suf-
ficiently narrow the availability of such a waiver so as to
eliminate any harm to members of the general public.
179. Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon, 479 P.2d 363 (Cal. 1971); see supra
Part II.G.1.
180. Guido, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437; see supra Part II.G.1.
181. See infra Part V.
182. U.C.C. (1992).
183. See supra Part II.F.
184. U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1992). See also supra Part II.F.
185. Id. at § 2-104(3). See also supra Part II.F.
186. 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986).
187. Id. at 1284.
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Part of the Greenspan appellate court's objection to a
clause waiving the right to sue for fraud in the inducement
when both parties to a contract were represented by counsel
during the transactional process was that "the number and
delicacy of the lines that would need to be drawn to imple-
ment such a rule would be prohibitive.""'8 However, using
the definitions of "merchant" and "between merchants" as de-
lineated in Wisconsin Knife and asking both parties to initial
particular clauses appears to be a reasonable option. The ini-
tialed clauses would include those defining their legal rela-
tionship and solidifying their decision to waive their right to
sue for fraud in the inducement.
D. Contracts Between Non-Sophisticated Business Parties
The court of appeal in Greenspan emphasized that Fisher
failed to follow a line of California cases holding that merger
clauses in a contract do not bar an action for fraud.'8 9 How-
ever, factually, the line of cases cited by the Greenspan court
of appeal varied substantially from Greenspan and Banco.' 90
In Simmons v. Ratterree Land Co.,19 a purchaser of real
property was granted a rescission on the ground of fraud,
even though the contract signed by the purchaser contained a
clause stating that the buyer relied only on those representa-
tions specifically stated in the contract. 92 Although the de-
fendant had agents, unlike Greenspan, there was no mention
that either party was represented by counsel throughout the
entire process of negotiating and drafting the sales agree-
ment.1 93 This case dealt with members of the general public
who did not have any special knowledge or education. 94
Similarly, there is no evidence that the plaintiff was
aided by counsel in the transactional process in Herzog v.
Capital Co.'95 There, the principal could not avoid liability
188. Ron Greenspan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Ford Motor Land Dev. Corp., 38
Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 788 n.6 (Ct. App. 1995), rev. denied, 1995 Cal. LEXIS 3383
(1995).
189. Id. at 790; see also supra Part II.D.2.
190. Greenspan, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 791; Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian,
Inc., 285 Cal. Rptr. 870 (Ct. App. 1991), rev. denied, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 302
(1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2967 (1992).
191. 17 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1932).
192. Id.; see supra Part II.D.2.a.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. 164 P.2d 8 (Cal. 1945). See supra Part II.D.2.b.
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for his own fraudulent conduct, even with a provision in the
contract stating that there were no representations or verbal
understandings other than those included in the contract. 196
There were no grounds for the defendant to argue, as respon-
dents did in Greenspan, that the merger clause in the con-
tract should be upheld because the plaintiff had the advan-
tage and superior knowledge of legal representation when the
contract was drafted and signed.197
Furthermore, in Vai v. Bank of America, 98 which fo-
cused on a community property issue, 99 the plaintiff was al-
lowed to assert fraud regardless of the "no representations"
provision in the contract.20 0 Although the plaintiff was repre-
sented by an attorney during the property settlement negoti-
ations, this was not a commercial or business transaction be-
tween two business persons.20 ' It was a simple case of a
member of the general public, not a sophisticated business
party, signing a contract containing a merger clause.20 2
Finally, in Buist v. C. Dudley DeVelbiss Corp.,2 °3 the
plaintiff, without the benefit of legal representation,
purchased real property. 2 4 The plaintiff was granted a judg-
ment for fraud.20 5 The court rejected the defendant's conten-
tion that the merger clause in the contract proved that the
alleged misrepresentations were not made.20 6
The above cases cited by the Greenspan court of appeal
held that the provision in the contract stating that no repre-
sentations or promises were made other than those contained
in the contract was insufficient to bar an action for fraud.
However, those cases are significantly different from the case
which faced the court of appeal in Greenspan.2 °7 Both Green-
span parties had the advantage of the sophisticated knowl-
196. Herzog v. Capital Co., 164 P.2d 8, 9 (Cal. 1945).
197. Id.
198. 364 P.2d 247 (1961). See supra Part II.D.2.c.
199. Vai, 364 P.2d at 256.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 249.
202. Id.
203. 6 Cal. Rptr. 259 (Ct. App. 1960). See supra Part II.D.2.d.
204. Buist v. Dudley DeVelbiss Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 259 (Ct. App. 1960).
205. Id. at 261.
206. Id. at 263.
207. Ron Greenspan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Ford Motor Land Dev. Corp., 38
Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 791 (Ct. App. 1995), rev. denied, 1995 Cal. LEXIS 3383
(1995).
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edge of their legal representation when the agreement was
drafted. 0 8 They were not simply relying on their own
knowledge.
E. Public Policy Considerations
There is a wide variety of public policy implications that
must be taken into account when looking at the introduction
of a waiver. New York courts, such as those deciding Sabo v.
Delman2 09 and Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris,210 and the
California court deciding Guido v. Koopman211 highlight such
considerations.
1. Sabo v. Delman
In Sabo, the plaintiff sought rescission of a contract on
the basis of fraud.2 12 The court ruled that the merger clause
contained in the contract was ineffectual in excluding evi-
dence of fraudulent representations.213 The court reasoned
that if the rule were otherwise, a defendant would easily be
able to "perpetrate a fraud with immunity, depriving the vic-
tim of all redress, if he simply has the foresight to include a
merger clause in the agreement... [plublic policy and moral-
ity are both ignored if such an agreement can be given effect
in a court of justice." 214
As with the cases cited by the Greenspan court of appeal
to prove that Fisher was not supported by its cited author-
ity,215 the plaintiff in Sabo was an ordinary individual who
did not have the advice of counsel during the transactional
process.216 However, the public policy concerns raised in
Sabo would not be so striking in cases such as Greenspan and
Banco, in which both parties had legal representation.21 7
The parties would have the advantage of an attorney clearly
explaining what it would mean to sign the agreement waiv-
208. Id. at 792.
209. 143 N.E.2d 906 (N.Y. 1957).
210. 157 N.E.2d 597 (N.Y. 1959).
211. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437 (Ct. App. 1991), rev. denied, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 2024
(1992).
212. Sabo, 143 N.E.2d at 906.
213. Id. at 909.
214. Id.
215. See supra Part II.D.1.
216. Sabo, 143 N.E.2d at 906.
217. Id.
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ing the right to sue for fraud in the inducement, and empha-
sizing that any aspects of the negotiations relied upon by the
parties which were not embodied in the written instrument
would be given no effect in court.218
2. Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris
In Danann, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants
made false representations that induced plaintiff to purchase
a contract of sale of a building lease. 219 Not only did the con-
tract include a merger clause, it also included a disclaimer as
to specific representations. 220
The Danann court refused to allow the plaintiff to suc-
cessfully assert a cause of action for fraud and avoid its bad
bargain, stating that "to hold otherwise would be to say that
it is impossible for two businessmen dealing at arm's length
to agree that the buyer is not buying in reliance on any repre-
sentations of the seller as to a particular fact."221 The dis-
claimer as to specific representations, like the proposed
clause allowing both sophisticated parties to waive the right
to sue for fraud in the inducement, provided certainty in the
contractual relations between the parties.222
Justice Fuld dissented in the Danann opinion, arguing
that "[i]f a party has actually induced another to enter into a
contract by means of fraud... language may not be devised
to shield him from the consequences." 223 Fuld asserted that
the public policy issue should outweigh the "advantages of
certainty in contractual relations," and that by refusing relief
for the plaintiff from such fraud, the court was essentially
"opening the doors to a multitude of frauds," which would re-
sult in "thwarting the general policy of the law."224
While Fuld's reasoning supports the general rule today
that merger clauses cannot prevent a suit for fraud in the in-
ducement, Fuld's concerns would be addressed by the pro-
posed guidelines, which require the parties to be "sophisti-
218. See supra Part V.
219. Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597 (N.Y. 1959) (Fuld, J.
dissenting).
220. Id. at 599.
221. Id. at 600.
222. Id.
223. Id. (Fuld, J. dissenting).
224. Id. at 601 (Fuld, J. dissenting).
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cated business parties" and have legal representation.22
Parties would be able to read the contract, know which repre-
sentations are not included in the text, and, if they so choose,
the parties may request that the contract be amended to in-
clude those items.
3. Guido v. Koopman
The appellants in Guido argued that the release freeing
the respondent from liability for appellant's horseback riding
accident was invalid based on Civil Code section 1668.226
However, the court found this argument erroneous, because
section 1668 "has been interpreted to mean that 'a contract
exempting from liability for ordinary negligence is valid
where no public interest is involved.' 227 In determining
whether a public interest was involved, the court examined
the type of transaction to decide whether it exhibited some of
the necessary characteristics. 22' Those qualifications in-
cluded whether:
[i]t concerns a business of a type generally thought suita-
ble for public regulation. The party seeking exculpation is
engaged in performing a service of great importance to the
public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for
some members of the public. The party holds himself out
as willing to perform this service for any member of the
public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming
within certain established standards. As a result of the
essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of
the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses
a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any
member of the public who seeks his services. In exercis-
ing a superior bargaining power the party confronts the
public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpa-
tion, and makes no provision whereby a purchaser may
pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection
225. See supra Parts IV.B. and IV.C.
226. Section 1668 provides: "All contracts which have for their object, di-
rectly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from [the] responsibility for his own
fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law,
whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law." CAL. Crv. CODE
§ 1668 (West 1996); see also Guido v. Koopman, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 439 (Ct.
App. 1991), rev. denied, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 2024 (1992).
227. Guido, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439; see 1 BERNARD E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNiA LAw, CONTRACTS § 631 (9th ed. 1990).
228. Guido, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439.
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against negligence. Finally, as a result of the transaction,
the person or property of the purchaser is placed under
the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness
by the seller or his agents.229
Business or commercial transactions, such as those at is-
sue in Greenspan2 30 and Banco,2 3' clearly are not part of the
category that section 1668 prevents from releasing itself from
liability.2 32 Their services are not of "great importance to the
public" such that they are truly necessary for some segments
of the population, nor are they "suitable for public regula-
tion."233 In addition, since both parties must be represented
by legal counsel throughout the contracting process,234 the
parties would have equal bargaining power. Thus, the public
policy concerns addressed by the Guido court are provided for
by the suggested merger clause waiving the right to sue for
fraud in the inducement. 235
F. Freedom of Contract
A final consideration is the notion of freedom of con-
tract.23 6 Freedom of contract consists of two aspects.237 The
first is freedom from contract, which refers to the belief that
individuals "should not have contractual obligations imposed
on them without their consent." 238 The second dimension is
freedom to contract, meaning that individuals should be able
to consent to an alteration of their legal relations if they see it
as necessary. 239 The proposed waiver is commensurate with
both principles of freedom of contract: it allows sophisticated
business parties to consciously alter their legal relations and
229. Id. (citation omitted).
230. Ron Greenspan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Ford Motor Land Dev. Corp., 38
Cal. Rptr. 2d 783 (Ct. App. 1995), rev. denied, 1995 Cal. LEXIS 3383 (1995).
231. Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc., 285 Cal. Rptr. 870, 881 (Ct. App.
1991), rev. denied, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 302 (1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2967
(1992).
232. Guido, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439.
233. Id.
234. See supra Part V.
235. See supra Part V.
236. Freedom of contract is defined as "the liberty or ability to enter into
agreements with others." BARRON'S LAw DICTIoNARY 201 (3d ed. 1991).
237. Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1021, 1023 (1992).
238. Id.
239. Id.
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to knowingly consent to the imposition of another contractual
obligation.
G. Violation of California Civil Code Section 1542
Allowing a waiver of the right to sue for fraud in the in-
ducement would violate section 1542,240 as it would clearly
keep a contracting party from suing for future claims the
party was not aware of at the time the waiver was signed.241
However, by narrowly defining the instances in which such a
waiver would be upheld in court 242 and requiring that the
parties be "sophisticated business parties,"243 the policy con-
cerns which led to the drafting of section 1542244 would be
retained, and the necessary certainty in business relations
would also be ensured. 245
V. PROPOSAL
A workable solution to the problem of uncertainty in
legal relations can be obtained by combining three factors:
(1) the definitions of "merchant" and "between merchants"2 46
as delineated in the applicable sections of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code and in Wisconsin Knife; (2) the concentration on
the knowledge or skill held by the parties to a contract, as
done in Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon2 47 and Guido v.
Koopman;24s and (3) the requirement that both parties be
represented by legal counsel throughout the entire process of
formulating and signing an agreement containing an unam-
biguous waiver clause. This combination would confine the
allowance of a waiver to specific, qualified parties.
240. See supra Part II.B.
241. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
242. See infra Part V.
243. See supra Part II.F and infra Part V.
244. "Civil Code section 1542 was intended by its drafters to preclude the
application of a release to unknown claims in the absence of a showing, apart
from the words of a release of an intent to include such claims." Casey v. Proc-
tor, 378 P.2d 579, 586 (Cal. 1963).
245. See Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc., 285 Cal. Rptr. 870 (Ct. App.
1991), rev. denied, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 302 (1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2967
(1992).
246. See supra Part II.F.
247. Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon, 479 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1971); see supra
Part IV.B.
248. Guido v. Koopman, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437 (Ct. App. 1991), rev. denied, 1992
Cal. LEXIS 2024 (1992); see supra Part IV.B.
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In order to avoid any ambiguities, the merger clause con-
taining the waiver would be clearly set out in the agreement.
In addition, each section of the merger clause would be sepa-
rately initialed by each party, and their attorneys, so that
any court would be certain that both parties, in waiving their
right to sue for fraud in the inducement, were advised and
informed that they were indeed giving up a right and knew
what that right was.
Such a waiver clause would state that each party agrees
that they should be considered a sophisticated business
party, meaning that they are akin to a "merchant" under the
Uniform Commercial Code.249 Also, the clause would assert
that the transaction entered into is indeed a contract "be-
tween merchants."250 Further, both parties would affirm that
they have been represented by legal counsel throughout the
entire negotiating and contracting process. Moreover, the
merger provisions would clearly state that each party was
knowingly waiving his or her right to sue for fraud in the in-
ducement, a right they would normally have if they chose not
to agree to the waiver.25' Finally, both parties would declare
that they were not relying on any representations which were
not contained in the written contract.
Regardless of whether a waiver of the right to sue for
fraud in the inducement as proposed is adopted, contractual
relations involving the general public would remain un-
touched. The necessary elements to recover for fraud, the re-
quirements to introduce parol evidence, and sections 1542
and 1668 of the California Civil Code would continue to ap-
ply.25 2 The public policy determination that individuals
should be prevented from perpetrating fraud and relieving
themselves of that responsibility by inserting a merger clause
in the contract, as discussed in detail by the Greenspan court
of appeal, would remain the law.253 Only the narrowly de-
fined area of business parties represented by counsel would
249. See supra Part II.F.
250. See supra Part II.F.
251. "It is well established that a party to an agreement induced by fraudu-
lent misrepresentations or nondisclosures is entitled to rescind, notwithstand-
ing the existence of purported exculpatory provisions contained in the agree-
ment." Guido, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 440.
252. See supra Parts II.A-B.
253. See Ron Greenspan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Ford Motor Land Dev. Corp., 38
Cal. Rptr. 2d 783 (Ct. App. 1995), rev. denied, 1995 Cal. LEXIS 3383 (1995).
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have the option to waive the right to sue for fraud in the
inducement.
A possible merger clause would state:
MERGER CLAUSE: WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO SUE
FOR FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT
By initialing each of the following statements, the parties
and their legal representatives agree to waive the right to
sue for fraud in the inducement, a right which they would
otherwise have:
(a) the parties agree that they fall under the defini-
tion of "merchant" in section 2-104(1) of the Uniform
Commercial Code.
(b) the parties agree that this contract is "between
merchants" as defined in section 2-104(3) of the Uni-
form Commercial Code.
(c) the parties acknowledge that they have been
represented by legal counsel throughout the negotia-
tion, drafting, and execution of this contract.
(d) the parties knowingly waive the right to sue for
fraud in the inducement, a right clearly explained by
their legal representative.
(e) the parties are relying only on the representa-
tions contained in this contract, and know that by in-
itialing all parts of this waiver, they will be unable to
introduce parol evidence in the future to show they
relied upon representations not contained in this con-
tract. _
VI. CONCLUSION
Allowing a waiver of the right to sue for fraud in the in-
ducement would uphold the principle that "if you shift risk or
limit liability in your contract, you should be stuck with
that." 254 Parties in a contractual setting should be free to
define their rights.25 5 Parties work together because it is
beneficial, and the goal of contract law is to induce such coop-
eration.256 Contract law mitigates the risk inherent in coop-
eration by enforcing the rights of the parties, and some bene-
ficial transactions would not occur without this
enforcement. 257 The law has gone through many changes in
254. Farnsworth, supra note 10, at 1034.
255. Friedmann, supra note 10, at 23.
256. Baird, supra note 9, at 584.
257. Id.
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the past few decades, resulting, in many cases, in people be-
ing relieved of their obligations. 258 By recognizing the right
of sophisticated business parties to include a provision in
their contract waiving the right to sue for fraud in the induce-
ment, courts would be providing for the judicial economy and
legal certainty necessary in contractual relations. 259
Megan R. Comport
258. Hon. Robert H. Bork, The Death of Contract and the Rise of Tort, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1021 (1992).
259. See supra Part II.E.
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